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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of China’s national identities and the impact on its foreign 
aid policies and practices. The multiple identities shape China’s role as a development 
partner in pursuit of economic cooperation with aid recipients and that seek to engage 
with traditional aid donors in terms of aid delivery.   
 
To explore the influence of national identities-the victimhood identity, the developing 
country identity and the rising responsible power identity behind China’s foreign aid 
policies and behaviors, this thesis uses a solid theoretical foundation-Constructivism. It 
analyses two empirical cases, the Fiji and the Cook Islands from 2006 to 2013, drawing 
from a large chunk of literature from English and Chinese publications, government 
documents, and relevant websites. 
 
The thesis finds that China’s aid policies and behaviors are mainly consistent with its 
victimhood and developing country identities. The country regards itself as a 
development partner rather than an aid donor and places great emphasis on mutual 
benefit and non-interference principles with a large proportion of its aid focused on 
infrastructure, construction-based projects. However, it also uncovers that China has 
started to address aid recipients’ demands. The country has also learned how to handle 
aid programs from other donor countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, which is 
incorporated into China’s new rising responsible power identity.  
 
The research aims to challenge the dominated rationality-based analysis and hopes to 
trigger further discussion about China’s aid and development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... 3 
Chapter I Introduction................................................................................................................... 4 
1.1 Background............................................................................................................... ........ 4 
1.2The Research Question and Hypothesis ................................................................................. 4 
1.3 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................5 
1.4 Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 11 
1.5 Methodology and Chapter Outline ..................................................................................... 16 
Chapter II the Formation of Chinese Foreign Aid Approach ...................................................... 17 
2.1 Historical Background ........................................................................................................ 17 
2.1.1 The Cold War Era 1950-1978—revolutionary in nature.................................................. 17 
2.1.2 The Reform era 1978-1995-pragmatic in nature............................................................ 20 
2.1.3 The Rise of China 1995-Current- Going global and Being Responsible............................. 22 
2.2 The trajectory of Identities and Norms in China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 ..................24 
2.2.1Self-Reliance and Self-Development.............................................................................. 25 
2.2.2. Non-interference and No Political Conditions .............................................................. 27 
2.2.3 Mutual Benefit and Equality ........................................................................................ 29 
2.3 The Institutionalization of Aid Norms and Types.................................................................. 31 
2.3.1 Operational Structure.............................................................................. .................... 31 
2.3.2 Types of Chinese Foreign Aid ....................................................................................... 33 
2.3.4 Aid Modalities...................................................................................... ....................... 36 
Chapter III China’s Bilateral Aid to the South Pacific: Cases Studies of Fiji and the Cook 
Islands ..........................................................................................................................................38 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 38 
3.2. The Rise of China and its Engagement with the South Pacific .............................................. 38 
3.3. Norms and Aid Practice..................................................................................................... 39 
3.3.1 One-China Policy ......................................................................................................... 39 
3.3.2 The limitation of Geopolitical Analysis ..........................................................................42 
3.4 Chinese Bilateral Aid Programs: Cases studies of Fiji and the Cook Islands ............................45 
3.4.1 Chinese Bilateral Aid Programs to Fiji ........................................................................... 45 
3.4.2 The Cook Islands ......................................................................................................... 50 
3.4.3 Cairns Compact or South-South Cooperation ................................................................ 53 
Chapter IV Conclusion ...............................................................................................................  57 
References ............................................................................................................................... 59
4 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party  
KMT Chinese Nationalist Party  
ROC Republic of China  
PRC  People’s Republic of China  
 
 
 
5 
 
Chapter I Introduction 
1.1 Background  
China has increasingly beenrecognized as “an emerging aid donor” in the company 
ofaccumulated wealth and rising influence particularly since the start of the Millennium 
(Woods 2008). In comparison to “established donors” who have broken promises of 
offering more aid in global financial crisis, China has built up aid programs and 
established stronger relationships with developing countries (2008, p.9). Against the 
backdrop, China’s aid to the South Pacific region has been remarkably increasing since 
2006, andin 2009 China has ranked the third largest donor to the region according to 
statistics provided by Sydney-based Lowy Institute (Hanson&Fifita 2011). More recently 
in 2013, China’s vice Premier Wang Yang reiterated the government’s commitment to 
provide assistance to the South Pacific countries at the Second China-Pacific Island 
Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum(FMPRC 2013). 
 
The increasing volume and influence of Chinese foreign aid has aroused IR scholars’ 
interest to ponder why China does so. For instance, China is motivated by geopolitical, 
commercial and diplomatic interestsin Africa, which applies to China’s engagement with 
other parts of the world. Consequently, a cost-benefit analyses leads to homogeneity of 
China foreign aid pattern, and it neglects the impact of non-material factors, such as 
norms, identities, on Chinese foreign aid. Thus, my research attempts to engage the 
debate by providing a deeper understanding of Chinese foreign aid sitting in a broad 
context of China’s further integration into international system.  
 
1.2The Research Question and Hypothesis  
The research question is concerned with the divergence and convergence of Chinese 
foreign aid as a rising power: to what extent has Chinese foreign aid converged with 
international aid norms since the start of the Millennium? I argue that a constructivism 
account is more convincing in explaining China’s recent engagement with the South 
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Pacific region than rationality account. This thesis therefore argues that China’s align 
with the international norms remains limited due to the multi-faceted identities it is 
having, albeit China has adopted a more cooperative stance in aid practices. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework  
The thesis will apply Constructivism as an International Relations theory to explain the 
formation of Chinese aid approach, in particular identities and norms in shaping China’s 
aid policies and practices. Constructivism regards there is no single state of “rationality” 
within a regime, ideational factors such as their individual national identities, shared 
expectations and norms, have been attributed to the non-homogeneity of states' 
behaviors (Hook et al. 2001,pp.42-47), in contrast to the external, material factors such 
as power or trade as emphasized by realism and liberalism.  
 
Identity in Constructivist account is of significance assuming that it shapes political 
actors’ interests or preference with respect to the context that states find them in. In 
social constructivist theory, identity is “a relatively stable, role–specific understandings 
and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, p.397).Despite a general consensus on “state 
identities were constructed within the social environment of international and domestic 
politics”, Constructivists disagree on the “weight of international versus domestic 
environment in shaping state identities (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001 p.399). Accordingly, 
a holistic approach seems to bridge-the structure and agent-the two domains together. 
It focuses on the mutually constitutive relationship between the dynamics of global 
system and the state against the rise and possible demise of the sovereign state 
(Reus-Smit 2013, p.228). To be specific, the relationship between structures and actors 
involves inter-subjective understandings and meanings. External environments do 
constrain states, but states can also transform these constraints by relating to them and 
acting upon them in new ways (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, p. 41). For 
China’s identity formation, it is shaped by both domestic and international environment; 
however, as I will demonstrate later, the weight of the two factors is determined by the 
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extent that China’s integration into international system.  
 
Furthermore, within this inter-subjective social context, constructivists view the 
behavior of states as driven by rules of appropriate behaviors. Norms therefore 
constitute standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.891). In other words, norms are deliberately chosen to 
reflect “identity and culture”, and promote the concept of correct behavior in a society 
as they prompt justification of states’ action (Yeh2010, p.37). As such, once 
institutionalized, norms, acting on the basis of established beliefs and values, become a 
source of legitimacy and constrain the behavior of states (Katzenstein 1996, 
p.5).However, the concept of norms is dynamic, and subjects to forces of evolution and 
change. It is subsequently through internal actors and external pressures, such as 
bureaucratic politics, blocs and business activities, that foreign policy and ideas of 
national interest become shaped (Hook et al. 2001, p.72).  
 
1.3. 1 The Implication of Constructivism for the Understanding of China’s Foreign Aid  
Constructivism provides insightful understandings of analyzing how domestic and 
international factors produce particular identities of a nation-state, and how, in turn, 
such identities influenceits interests and behaviors. IRs scholars have applied Wendt’s 
insights into studying China’s identity, and put emphasis on its search for a right place in 
the world. Deng Yong, for instance, defines China’s national identity as “ who are we, 
what do we collectively aspire to, what is special about being Chinese, and what most 
distinguishes us from rest of the world”(2000,p.44). Moreover, Robert Scalapino (1993, 
pp.215-216) stresses political elites’ efforts in making China’s national identity. He 
explains to us: 
‘relates to the way in which a people, and especially a policy-making elite, perceive 
the essence of their nation in relations to others. It thus influences attitudes and 
policies alike, being the psychological foundation for the role and behavior 
patterns of a country in the international arena…’ 
 
Thus, National identity could be understood here as a set of shared beliefs by the 
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Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and policy-makers on “who we are” and “what we do” 
in the international system.  
 
Furthermore, Scalapino (1993, p.217) also reminds us that the concept of national 
identity is not fixed, but “it is constantly in flux being altered by a host of internal and 
external factors”. Likewise, Wendt (1994, p.2)argues that “actors normally have multiple 
social identities which have both individual and social structural properties…which 
enable an actorto determine who I am/we are in a situation and positions in a social role 
structure of shared understandings and expectations”. In China’s case, this could 
attribute to the interaction with outside world that China continues to redefine its 
status and identity in order to re-position itself within the international community 
(Zhou 2008, p.144). 
 
China’s national identities have been formed by both political factors and also its 
interactions with the international community over time.  
 
The victimhood identity  
The victimhood identity has its origins in what Chinese called “a century of humiliation”, 
which began with China’s defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842) and ended with 
the establishment of the PRC in 1949. William Callahan (2004, pp.37-8) argues that 
Chinese foreign policy has been described as closely related to its sense of insecurity, 
because of  the shame it felt over the lost territory. Then, this victimhood identity is 
further constructed for most of the period from 1949 to 1976 during which China was 
isolated internationally due to its ideological hostility towards American and Soviet 
hegemony. This isolated victim identity provided China an opportunity toseek foreign 
relations with Third World countries. Therefore, PRC would rather be an aid donor to its 
friends and partners in developing world than be an aid recipient of the developed 
world regardless of the economic backwardness (Yeh 2010, p.39). However, in the 
post-Cold war era, the end of the capitalist-communist division has presented CCP 
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leaders with new challenges to the legitimacy of one-party political system. Particularly, 
in the wake of Tiananmen incident and the dissolution of Soviet Union, the construction 
of victimized identity therefore focused on strengthening the victimization narrative in 
Chinese national identity. As such, to wingeneral public’s support for the regime has 
been prioritized by the leadership in maintaining stability at home (Atanassova-Cornelis 
2012, p.29). 
 
The construction of developing country identity  
Withan increasing recognition from the international system, the victimizedidentity has 
been in decline, andgradually transformed to the construction of a developing country 
identity.  
 
This variation emerged during the Deng Xiaoping era when the CCP leadership started to 
promotereforming policies, and it continued to be constructed by his successors, Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao. The developing country identity puts emphasis on China’s 
economic growth, and it also maintains the long-time narrative of a humiliated history. 
For the latter, as GustaafGeeraerts(2007, p.6) argues, it has injected an element of 
inferiority into the national identity that has remained. In a way, to build a strong 
nation-state and the realization of modernity and prosperity have been objectives 
endured throughout successive leaderships since the founding of PRC. And the 
formation of developing country identity reflects the efforts the Party has made in 
pursuit of strengthening people’s loyalty towards the Party. It in turns guarantees its 
own legitimacy and preserves domestic political stability. Accordingly, development in 
official term serves “the basis for solving all problems in China and for China to conduct 
effective diplomacy” (Atanassova-Cornelis 2012, p.97)Therefore, the developing country 
identity has provided China with dual roles in seeking cooperative relations with 
international donor community, and also in maintaining good relations with developing 
countries. As such, in Deng’s era, China became more comfortable with both an aid 
recipient and an aid donor.  
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And yet, the developing country identity seems lose its legitimacy given China’s 
remarkable economic growth. However, the maintenance of the rigid self-perception in 
international aid community has legitimate reasons. First and foremost, it is a powerful 
political message to Chinese general public. As prosperity is the ultimate goal for a 
strong statehood, it helps achieve it under the leadership of CCP, and thus maintain the 
legitimacy of CCP governing its own people. Moreover, it could also be an appealing 
message to recipient counties. Carol Lancaster (2007, p.5) argues that:  
 
For political reasons they want to project their own distinctive image in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America—one of South-South cooperation…one of having emerged 
rapidly(but not yet completely)from those problems, and one that will provide 
them with a separate and privileged relationship with the governments they are 
helping and cultivating.  
 
In addition, it is a reflection of China’s relations with the Western powers making the 
former distinguished from traditional donors. Philip Snow (1994, p.309) highlighted 
China would abandon the developing world once it had repaired relations between itself 
and Western powers following changes in Chinese identity. In this sense, China certainly 
insists on its developing country identity domestically and internationally. Likewise, 
China will maintain its dual roles bothas an aid recipient and an aid partner.  
 
The construction of a rising power identity  
The past two decades has witnessed China’s wealth generation and rising influencein 
the international arena. To be specific, China aspires to be a globally respected power 
precisely projecting a populace unrelenting image that China is standing tall on the 
world stage under the leadership of the CCP. In practice, David Shambaugh(2013 p.23) 
attributes this to the pursuit of “face diplomacy”. For instance, it means that China is 
willing to announce aid programs (projects) during high level of official visits in order to 
gain face (respect).  
 
Furthermore, Geeraerts (2007, p.6) argues that the enjoyment of being an emerging 
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power could be interpreted into two dimensions. The first variant is to win back the 
status of a “global power” suggesting the nation will flourish again and become stronger 
in the 21st century. However, this one is embedded with the notions of realism and 
nationalism and is more appealing to domestic audience, but would be highly unsuitable 
in the eyes of the international society. By contrast, another interpretation is of being a 
“responsible country” as China has firmly integrated into the liberal international 
community (Geeraerts 2007, p.7). This one is associated with liberalism which is highly 
expected by western players, but is not necessarily convinced by Chinese home front. 
 
The construction of a rising power identity is also shaped by the international system. 
Chinese foreign policy expert Gerald Chan has noted (2006, p.25), as China is more 
interactive with the outside world, there raises an expectation, “that the country should 
shoulder greater responsibility to international society”. Accordingly, the international 
community, in company with the rise of China, is expecting the latter to be a responsible 
stakeholder. Most notably, in 2005 in his remarks to the National Committee on 
U.S.-China Relations, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick(2005) argued, 
it is time to take American’s policy beyond opening the door to China’s membership into 
the international system; it needs to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in 
the system. As Brant (2012, p.14) explains, the responsible stakeholder concept has 
been “espoused as a way for the US (and China) try to manage China’s rise”. In the same 
vein, Zoellick (2005) also expressed an uncertainty of China’s future, proclaiming that 
“may countries hope china will pursue a peaceful rise”, but none will be their future on 
it. Thus, this concept is designed to fulfill as both a roadmap for how China can help 
strengthen the international system, and also a framework for diplomacy with China. 
 
To response Zoellick’s argument, Gerald Chan insightfully points that, the fundamental 
elements to the Western thinking of responsibility is consist of individualism, freedom, 
and democracy leaving China little room for choice, thus China has to face this dilemma 
in its globalization effort(2006,pp.38-39). Thus, how to define responsibility and 
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construct a responsible power remains an unresolved question for China, whichechoes a 
paradoxical position China is posing.  
 
In addition, the construction of a rising power identity is associated with the other two 
identities. Shambaugh (2013, p.23) reminds us that the long-time narrative of 
overcoming the “century of shame and humiliation” is one of the determinants of 
China’s behavior in the international arena, because the CCP’s legitimacy from the very 
beginning is largely dependent on this mission. It is also related to the developing 
country identity as reaching the goal of prosperity and modernization is regarded as an 
effective cure for economic backwardness. Thus, the claim of “one China” policy as a 
unified PRC is no more than a protection of the weak China being victimized by great 
power politics, but it also demonstrates that China is sufficient to deter aggressions and 
to protect its own sovereignty in this sense.  
 
Thus, the paradoxical position of a responsible rising power has an impact on Chinese 
foreign aid behaviors. Namely, China has possessed a more proactive action in 
participating in international foreign aid programs in providing large proportions of 
loans, credits and debt write-offs with special trade arrangements and commercial 
investments in developing countries (Woods 2008, p.1). However, the 
vigorousengagement does not mean China has fully accommodated to the international 
aid norms nor meeting up its own national interests yet. Zhao (2013, p.50) reminds us 
that China is still very reluctant and very selective in taking on global and regional 
responsibilities. Hence, it becomes both possible and necessary to explore whether any 
convergence towards international aid norms have occurred in Chinese aid behaviors, 
and how China’s primary motivations for aid donations have undergone changes both in 
aid norms and practices.  
 
1.4 Literature Review  
At the outset of my research, current scholarly debates have been empirical-oriented in 
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order to clarify and reinterpret misconceptions of China’s foreign aid. Large chunk of 
literature on Chinese foreign aid have been studying its engagement with African 
countries. Chris Alden, in “China in Africa” (2007) provides a good empirical analysis on 
some misunderstandings that the West devours on the controversial nature and speed 
of China’s increasingly engagement in Africa. Through his balanced argument, Alden 
claims that the request for natural resources, the legacy of ideology and the influence of 
recognition issues together have shaped China’s African policy. He suggests that Chinese 
engagement could be beneficial to African development in particular through its 
investment capital and development assistance. Literature has shifted from analysis of 
Chinese foreign policy to international political economy and institutional approach in 
studying china’s aid policy towards Africa. The study conducted by The Centre for 
Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University “how China delivers development assistance 
to Africa” (2008) provides a detailed account of China’s commercial engagement in 
selected empirical case studies. The report is significant in identifying the key issues 
relating to Chinese aid, outlining the different types of aid and highlighting institutions 
and Chinese state enterprises involved in participating Chinese aid provision. The report 
deconstructs the rhetoric and practices of Chinese aid. It calls for improvements to the 
transparency and cooperation with traditional donors on China’s aid in this region.  
 
Seen State-led economic cooperation and commercial driven initiatives as the main 
component of Chinese foreign aid, Deborah Brautigam in her book “The Dragon’s 
Gift”(2009) goes a further step arguing that the past experience of a recipient from 
developed countries and a pursuit of a developmental state model have shaped China’s 
business driven model of development. Brautigam draws our attention that the quantity 
of China’s aid figures commonly reported in studies are exaggerated due to Chinese’s 
self-conception of aid which is different from the standard measure of foreign aid used 
by other donors. She points out that the motivations for aid-financed projects are mixed 
with the eagerness of request for natural resources and nurturing Chinese enterprises to 
generate business. The author emphasizes on China is learning how to be transparency 
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and to regulate labors. Although being criticized by providing a rosy picture of China’s 
aid in general, Deborah Brautigam provides insights into my research and I shall further 
study how China generates its aid model through a historical account. 
 
The second group has been utilizing rational, cost and benefits approach to understand 
the motivations behind China’s foreign aid. While linking to China’s regional 
engagement with the South Pacific region, the dominant discourse is concerns with 
China’s geopolitical, diplomacy and commercial interests. A then Chinese scholar Jian 
Yang who now serves as a New Zealand National Party list MP published a book “The 
Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy” (2011), at the time when the “China threat” 
theories become popularized in this region. Yang argues that China’s approach to the 
Pacific islands region should be understood under China’s grand strategy which is to 
help China build up the economic and technological foundation necessary to become a 
rich and prosperity country. Yang critically evaluated China’s aid to Fiji identifying 
China’s interests, aid type, the progress of Chinese aid financed –projects with 
conclusions that China is unlikely to displace Australia and New Zealand’s strong 
influence in this region but will be more cooperative with them.  
 
IR scholars such as Marc Lanteigne places China in the South Pacific in a broader 
dynamic of the rise of China and its impacts on global traditional powers. In his recent 
study, “Water dragon? China, power shifts and soft balancing in the South Pacific” 
(2012), Lanteigne argues China’s engagement with the South Pacific region is motivated 
by strategic purpose and it is an extension of grate powers’ competition in the East and 
South Eastern Pacific. He in particularly highlights political nature of China’s foreign aid 
though the means of soft balancing behaviors such as aid provision but ultimately 
aiming at challenging traditional powers such as the United States and its 
alliances(Australia and New Zealand)to this region.  
 
A series of reports has been published by Sydney-based think tank Lowy Institute on 
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China’s engagement in the South Pacific. In the newly-released report “Big Enough For 
all Of US” (2013), Jenny Hayward-Jones argues that China is primarily supporting its 
commercial interests to fulfill its own economic development and pursuing South-South 
cooperation in this region. She claims that China is unlikely to promote a geo-strategic 
competition to challenge existing regional order. She suggests that traditional donors 
shall be cooperative with China in areas that could be beneficial to Pacific Islands. Those 
scholars unanimously assume that China is a rational actor who knows very well about 
what it wants and how it behaves. China’s engagement with the South Pacific like 
elsewhere is to maximum its utility in tangible or intangible terms of security, wealth 
and power. However, they are not interested in questioning where those ideas come 
from and are able to shape Chinese foreign aid behaviors.  
 
The third bunch of literature derives from Chinese scholarly works. The quantity of 
academic publications on China foreign aid has been gradually increasing in Chinese 
literature since 2010. It is the year marked 60 years of China’s foreign aid provision 
perhaps draw scholars in China attention. Therefore, it is significant and necessary to 
have an overview on how Chinese scholars in China studying the topic in recent years. 
Scholarly works such as “China’s foreign Aid: Achievements, Lesson and Benign 
development” (Yang & Chen 2010) provides a historical overview on China 60 years of 
foreign aid. It argues that 1978 is a landmark marked a beginning of a more pragmatism 
approach of Chinese aid provision. It calls for conducting more theoretical research on 
aid, and it suggests that China’s domestic development is still the priority and thus 
foreign aid should be provided within its capability. Researchers from China Academy of 
International Trade and Economic Cooperation affiliated with China’s Ministry of 
Commerce such as Xiaoqing Mao examines the position China should take in 
international donor community. The author argues that (2010) those traditional donors 
such as the United States and European Union remain the rules makers of international 
aid norms. As an emerging donor, as the author suggests, China should cooperate with 
other newly emerging economies under the framework of South-South cooperation.  
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Chinese scholars have responded to the publication of China first White Paper on Aid 
2011, In the essay, “Ideational differences between China and the West in foreign aid” 
(2012), Yanbing Zhang and Ying Huang are consistent with Chinese official aid white 
paper arguing that the experience of being a recipient and its own experience of 
development have shaped China’s foreign aid activities. It highlights “self-reliance”, “no 
political strings attached” and “mutual benefits” are the core values embedded with 
China’s foreign (aid) policy. It draws our attention that Marxism remains the dominant 
ideology emphasizing on material development in recipients. It calls for the 
improvements to aid effectiveness through a trilateral cooperation mechanism with the 
West. With increasingly economic engagement to other regions, Huang Meibo and Ren 
Peiqiang (2012) provide a more cooperative attitude towards traditional donors. They 
argue that China has adopted a more pragmatism approach since 1978 other than 
insisting on Marxism doctrine. They call for the improvements to conduct further 
research of China’s foreign aid as an integral part of China’s foreign policy, and to learn 
and cooperate with traditional donors. Inclining to learn from traditional donors, 
scholarly works in Chinese under reviewed are descriptive in nature, lacking of 
theoretical analysis to formulate their arguments. At the same time, those literatures 
are inadequate in considering the impacts on recipients with no empirical evidence to 
back up their arguments.  
 
Thus, through a survey of the exiting literature in recent five years, the three groups of 
scholarly works are inadequate to understand China’s foreign aid approach/model. 
Theoretically speaking, rational, cost-benefits analysis has largely applied to understand 
what has motivated China’s engagement with recipient countries led to homogeneity of 
aid pattern. Furthermore, China is no difference from any other donors, interests-driven 
in nature. In empirical sense, the study of China’s engagement into the South Pacific 
region has paid less attention to. Indeed, the thickness of the institutional environment 
of the region along with the trends of a rising China has provided unique opportunity to 
explore Chinese foreign aid approach with the transformation of its status. Last but not 
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the least, the two isolated discourses between English literature and Chinese scholarly 
works do not contribute to a better understanding and collaborations among scholars, 
policy makers and aid practitioners both in China and abroad. Thus, there is a gap in 
current scholarship, and I will attempt to narrow it down in my MIR thesis by applying 
Constructivism as a conceptual tool to better understand the dynamic of Chinese 
foreign aid, and by putting emphasis on China’s engagement with the South Pacific 
region.
 
1.5 Methodology and Chapter Outline  
The thesis takes a qualitative analysis and case studies as the main methodology. A 
qualitative analysis is on the basis of international relations theory to elaborate the 
formation of Chinese foreign aid. Then, two cases of China’s engagement with two 
South Pacific countries, Fiji and the Cook Islands, are under scrutiny by examining the 
changes and continuations of China’s foreign aid approach. Besides, basic facts and data 
about China’s aid policy and practice are collected from literature, official publications 
and relevant websites. 
 
The first chapter is designed to build up a conceptual tool for understanding the changes 
and continuations of Chinese foreign aid approach. The second chapter contributes to 
explain what Chinese foreign aid approach is about, with a focus on the formation of aid 
principles and norms since the establishment of PRC in 1949. It also examines 
aid-related institutions and types to further justifying the theoretical approach. Building 
upon the first two chapters, the third one looks into China’s foreign aid behaviors in a 
regional context. In particular, it explores whether China’s own aid program is being 
influenced by its interactions with the regional donors and recipient countries. The final 
chapter makes a conclusion on China’s foreign aid in practice in the hope of evaluating 
the significance of China in the normative structure of the donor community. 
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Chapter II the Formation of Chinese Foreign Aid Approach 
 
Having analyzed China’s identities and aid norms on a theoretical basis, this chapter is 
aiming to investigate to what extent identities and norms’ factors can explain the 
formation of Chinese foreign aid behaviors.In turn,it helps us understand what Chinese 
foreign aid is about, and thereby serves as the basis to examine the changes and 
continuations of the aid policy. To be specific,this chapter outlines the evolution of the 
policy from 1950 to current, particularly the influence of identities and norms thathave 
shaped the transformation of China’s foreign aid policy. As a result, the principles, 
features and organizational structure of Chinese aid system have been gradually 
developed, and then institutionalized.  
 
2.1 Historical Background  
China has a more than half decadehistory of aid provision. Power and Mohan (2010, 
p.12) remind us that “[History] functions as a discursive field through which current 
foreign aid policy is legitimized” (2010, p.12).Thus, a historical approach is helping us 
better understand what domestic and international environments that influence 
Chinese foreign aid policies and practices. The division of time period is classified on the 
basis of China’s relations with the international system, with basically three periods of 
time, namely, the revolutionary stage (1950-1978), the pragmatic reform (1978-1995), 
and going global and being responsible (1995-current).  
 
2.1.1 The Cold War Era 1950-1978—revolutionary in nature  
Chinese foreign aid in Mao Zedong’s era has shaped an ideological basis of China’s 
current aid-giving principles. Aid during this time frame is political in nature. Against the 
backdrop of the Cold War era, realpolitik and ideological confrontation are the features 
of international system, which is constructed by the major players-the United States and 
Soviet Union. Lisa Anderson reminds us that “the major combatants-the United States 
and the Soviet Unionconstructed the conflict as one that transcended the realpolitik of 
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state interests to represent deep ideological commitments”(2004,p.9).  
 
Against the Cold War setting, China has an intimated relation with the Soviet since the 
establishment of PRC, particularly from 1950 to 1960. The shared common ideology 
makes the Soviet Union China’s revolutionary comrade, as Steven Goldstein has noted 
(1994, p.229).As a result, the PRC signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance 
with the Soviet long before the former’s establishment (Copper 1976, 
p.116).Furthermore, as a newly established socialist regime, China desperately needs 
knowledge and some advice in running an industrialized economy (Halpern 1993, p.96). 
The PRC must learn from the Soviet Union, the only advanced industrialized economy in 
socialist bloc, and are expecting to receive more aid from the later to develop the 
socialist economy. As such, China began to build up an industrialized economy with the 
Soviet material and technical assistance (Zhou&Xiong 2012, p.17). And,it adopted no 
foreign aid policy but served as an extension of Soviet aid according to Franklin Cooper 
(1976, p.116).  
 
However, the intimate relations did not last too long. PRC quickly regarded the Soviet 
model as “revisionism”due to a disagreement with the Soviet on how socialism worksin 
the early 1960s.Goldstein has noted that Mao’s radical socialist vision has a decisive 
impact on the Sino-Soviet alliance (1994, p.243). In additionto a split with the Soviet, the 
PRC was hostile towards the United States which didn’t recognize the legitimacy of the 
socialist China back then. Deborah Brautigam (2011, p.30) explains to us that the US 
imposed an economic embargo on PRC since its establishment in 1949 for more than 
twenty years.  
 
Due to an isolated international environment, the then premier Zhou Enlai’s ten-nation 
tour of the African continent in 1963-1964 embarked a significant stage in China’s 
foreign (aid) diplomacy. And it was featured the announcement of Eight Principles of 
Chinese Foreign Aid which is consist of equality, mutual benefits, and respect for the 
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sovereignty of the host, and emphasis on no strings attached and self-reliance. It is 
regarded as “the cornerstone of Chinese foreign aid still today”, as Brant explains (2013, 
p.74). Thus, Beijing’s foreign aid was provided to support socialist or revolutionary 
movements which were seen as an alternative to the Soviet socialist model. He 
Wenping(2010, p.140) quoted Mao’s remarks to further explaining the ideas 
underpinned Chinese foreign aid when the Chinese leader met with African leaders in 
the 1960s stating that “in people who have achieved revolutionary victory should 
provide assistance to the people who are still struggling for liberation, and this is our 
international duty”, which in Li Anshan’s (2007, pp.70-71) wordsis“on the struggle 
against colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the Third World”.  
 
In relations toaid principles, Chinese foreign aid policies and practices were a reflection 
of ideological and geopolitical concerns. Mitchell and McGiffert(2007, p.13) summarize 
that Chinese foreign aid back then support international communist struggle to fight 
against imperialists and for its own independence. In practice, Chinese foreign aid was 
therefore to help communist movements and independence in a range of developing 
countries, including Angola, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, 
Zimbabwe, Thailand and Uganda. By 1973, China has committed to aid seven countries 
in Asia, six in the Middle East, three in Latin America, and twenty-nine in Africa 
(Brautigam2011, p.41). In operation, financed aid was targeted on projects with tangible 
results, agriculture and technical assistance. Furthermore, types of aid were consisting 
of loans (non-conditional, interest-free, or low-interests). Then Premier Zhou Enlai (2011, 
p.189) remarked in Government Work Report to the first Session of the Third National 
People’s Congress:  
 
In recent years, we have expanded the scale of our foreign aid *…+ we have 
summed up years of experience and formulated eight principles. We have always 
strained ourselves to help others and we have adopted the method of grants and 
low-interest rate loans in providing aid (emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, high economic costs of a number of landmark projects (eg. stadiums, 
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hospitals, conference centers) represented a symbolic meaning of nationhood and also 
China’s moral support to African countries(Li 2007,p.72). One typical example was 
China’s construction of the 1,800 kilometer Tan-Zam Railway between Tanzania and 
Zambia between the years 1970-1975, involved 16,000 Chinese workers. Both countries 
were led by socialist leaders and were regarded as China’s closest friends (Brautigam 
2011, p.40). However, one fundamental flaw of Chinese foreign aid project is that it has 
outpaced China’s economy capacity. As Brautigam(2011,pp.51-52) illustrates, during the 
Cultural Revolution (1967-1976)Chinese foreign aid took an average of 5 percent of 
government expenditure including nineteen enormous “100 million RMB” projects 
which were completed regardless of economic costs and benefits. In addition, Chinese 
foreign aid programs failed to address the needs of recipient countries.(He 2012, 
pp.141-142). 
 
Brant (2012,p.75)reminds us that the ideology of this era-third world solidarity, 
friendship (poor-helping the poor), equality, mutual benefit is vital to keep in mind in 
comparison with contemporary Chinese foreign aid norms and China’s engagement with 
the South Pacific regions in the next chapter.  
 
2.1.2 The Reform era 1978-1995-pragmatic in nature  
This era marks the roots of Chinese economic engagement with other developing 
countries. And, it also represents a high level of engagement with donor countries with 
a fundamental shift from ideological commitment to economic pragmatism. The 
changes of domestic political and economic situation in this period of time reproduce a 
new aid policy based on economic cooperation and mutual benefit. Furthermore, it was 
the time when aid delivery system begins to shape and improve.  
 
In the time frame, the PRC’s legitimacy was increasingly accepted by the international 
community with gaining the permanent seat of UN in 1971 following establishing 
diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States respectively in 1978 and 
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1979.Furthermore, Chinese foreign policy has shifted from an ideological-oriented 
mentality towards pragmatism in order to booster domestic economic growth. When 
Deng Xiaoping came to power in late 1970s, it embarked on a time of reform and 
opening up. Domestic economic development towards the goal of modernization is 
prioritized, and at the same time, the mentality towards international relations has 
become more cooperative.Thus, Maoist perception of self-reliance has been abandoned 
to a deep involvement in the international economic system. Likewise, China would 
require not only considerable assistance from abroad, but also a peaceful international 
environment (Goldstein 1994, p.251). As Gerald Chan argues, it shows that China has 
become more “normal”-that receiving aids from the outside “is not regarded as a 
national shame, if it can maintain “self-sufficiency” permanently (2006, p.23). As such, 
under Deng’s leadership, he redefined China’s role as both an aid recipient and an aid 
provider. Since 1979, China began to receive a large amount of multilateral aid and also 
bilateral aid from Japan, Germany, making China one of the biggest aid recipients in the 
world to acquire resources and knowledge needed to speed up domestic economic 
development, according to Zhou (2011, p.193).  
 
At the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in East Europe, Tiananmen 
Square protests in 1989 have had a profound impact on China’s foreign aid policy, in the 
international front, the condemnations along with economic sanction by Western 
donors pushed China to further enhancing its relations with developing world, 
particularly with African countries, including making foreign aid double from around 
RMB 1.6 billion in 1991 to almost RMB 3 billion in 1994(Varrall 2012, p.147)). 
Furthermore, China has adopted a low-profile policy in the wake of the Western 
sanction (literallytaoguang yang hui) biding time while hiding capabilities, and focusing 
on national strength-building, as Suisheng Zhao (2013, pp.32-33) explains. 
 
During this period of time, Chinese foreign aid programs embarked on integrating with 
its economic development strategy. As Brant explains(2012, p.76), China began to 
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experiment with different forms of economic cooperation in order to achieve 
“cooperation for mutual benefits”, such as contracted construction projects, agricultural 
projects, training, labor services, and joint venture activities in order to increase the 
efficiency of bilateral aid.In the same token, Zhou Hong (2013, p.24) attributes this to 
the development of market economy, arguing that China has established joint ventures 
with donor countries. As such, Foreign aid was utilized to support Chinese companies in 
establishing joint venture investments in recipient countries. However, owing to the lack 
of foreign reserves in many countries, China sets up a system of “connecting 
countertrade to development projects”, as Brant illustrates (2012, p.77) that it is a 
barter system where innovative sources of repayment were arranged in ways that 
benefited both China and recipients.  
 
Additionally, China has undergone a series of profound domestic economic and political 
reforms that have pushed its foreign (aid) policy to become more open to the 
international community. China starts receiving bilateral and multilateral aid as it has 
changed its attitude towards international assistance and further developed its aid 
delivery mechanism through the interaction with donor countries. Furthermore, the 
influence of ideology, particularly communist ideology has declined, and pragmatism 
has correspondingly increased as Zhao has noted (1996, p.53). Thus, China began to 
understand foreign aid could be used as means to booster national economic 
modernization in request for resources and materials needed. As Robert Sutter (2008, 
p.2) insightfully comments, Chinese leaders are seen to be focused on promoting China 
economic development while maintaining political and social stability. As a result, 
Chinese foreign aid programs as an integral part of Chinese foreign policy placing great 
emphasis on international economic exchange beneficial to Chinese development and 
recipient countries, along with the consistence of “non-interference” and “no strings 
attached” aid principles.  
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2.1.3 The Rise of China 1995-Current- Going global and Being Responsible  
Chinese foreign aid during this period has been keeping pace with the rapid economic 
growth with adherence to the traditional principles of equality and mutual benefits. 
China’s foreign aid policy was designed to fulfill the needs of domestic economic 
development. A veteran international relations analyst Stefan Halper(2010, p.140)points 
out, domestic economic development is vital to the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party, thus it is indisposed to give up a consistent economic growth at a rate 
for Chinese policy makers. In operation, the foreign aid policy incorporates into the 
national macroeconomic strategy. Kobayashi (2008, pp.37-38) explains that the national 
development strategy, namely, “Five-Year Plan” has influenced Chinese foreign aid 
policy. Although there was no direct reference to aid policy in the Tenth Five Year Plan 
(2001-2005), foreign aid became part of the China’s “going global” strategy for securing 
access to needed natural resources and expanding overseas market (Kondoh et al. 2010, 
p.37). In this sense, it could be labeled as neo-mercantilism with the similar features of 
Japanese ODA to China during 1978 to early 1990s. To be sure, China is still seeking for 
economic development placing emphasis on social welfare and sustainability, and it also 
attempts to improve its social standing in the international community through 
cooperative and responsible means.  
 
Thus, the rise of China in company withrapid wealth generation enables China to 
acquire influence and respect in international arena as a rising power. To be a 
responsible great power reflecting China’s concern with its image and desires to be seen 
as responsible, seeking to relieve fears associated with its rise. Being a responsible 
power also interplays with foreign aid provision. In fact, the Chinese government has 
positively responded to this. As Brant explains (2012, p.88) that  
 
‘The Chinese Government understands and seems to accept the norm that 
important members of the international community should be giving aid, and 
regards this as a relatively easy way to offer evidence of its responsible actions’.  
 
In the same token, Deng (2005, p.64) argues that China is accepting of the established 
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patterns or international orders to international interactions. In fact, in Chinese foreign 
aid White paper, it states in the open paragraph that China has been providing aid as 
part of fulfilling its due international obligations (2011, the White Paper). Chinese 
international relations scholar Zhou(2012,p.36) argues that in practice China’s foreign 
aid has included providing medical and training services to developing countries which 
demonstrated China has extended to social aspects to needs of recipients. In 2005, then 
President Hu Jintao (2005 United Nations) stated China’s response to the fulfillment of 
MDGs: 
 
China will, in the next three years, increase its assistance to developing countries, 
African countries in particular, by providing them with anti-malaria drugs and other 
medicines, helping them set up and improve medical facilities and training medical 
staff. Specific programs will be implemented through such mechanism as the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation as well as bilateral channels. China will help 
train 30,000 personnel of various professions for developing countries within the 
next three years so as to help relevant countries to speed up their human 
resources development. 
 
To sum up, Chinese aid in this period has expanded in scope, scale, financing, location 
and effect along with the strength of China’s economic capability. When further 
integrating into the world economy facing accelerated competitions in global market, 
China seeks to further foreign aid and economic linkages (Brant 2012, p.78). 
Furthermore, along with the rise of China, the international community is expecting a 
responsible actor to shoulder more global responsibility, and thus the presentation of 
new trends of Chinese foreign aid in terms of aid programs, aid modalities are worthy of 
analysis in this section. 
 
2.2 The trajectory of Identities and Norms in China's Foreign Relations Since 1949  
Chinese aid principles and norms influence the way Chinese aid is presented, and also is 
perceived by traditional donors. Brant (2012, p.90) reminds us that “the way China 
presents and conceptualizes its aid is important as it indicates the way it wants it to be 
perceived”. Chinese aid principles and norms could link to China’s multiple identities 
which I have analyzed in the first chapter. The Eight principles of Chinese Foreign Aid as 
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commonly cited narratives was announced by then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. 
It is consist of equality, mutual benefit, and respect for the sovereignty of the host (the 
principles of peaceful coexistence), and emphasis on no strings attached and 
self-reliance. These principles have been rearticulated by successive Chinese politicians 
and government officials, and are still regarded as “the cornerstone of Chinese foreign 
aid still today”, as Brant explains (2013, p.74).Some of these elements are reemphasized 
in the 2011 released official White Paper as core norms of Chinese foreign aid: fostering 
recipient countries self-development capacity leading to self-reliance development; 
neither imposing political conditions nor interfering with recipients domestics issues and, 
adhering to equality and mutual benefit(2011,English translate of the White 
Papter,pp.5-6).  
 
The following section is analyzing the formation of the three core norms of 
Chinese-self-development and self-reliance; non-interference and non-conditionality; 
and equality and mutual benefit. It will trace the formation and evolution of those 
norms, and thus inform our later analysis of the continuation and changes of Chinese 
aid approach as the further integration into the international system.  
 
2.2.1Self-Reliance and Self-Development  
Self-Reliance and Self-Development are the fundamental tenet which China always 
adheres to. When providing foreign aid for recipient countries, china attempts toi build 
up their self-development capacities (the White Paper 2011, p.5). The self-reliance 
principle is a reflective of China’s victimhood identity due to the historical “national 
humiliation”, and is also reinforced because of international isolation in the Cold War 
era. It demonstrates two forms: the right to choose one’s own path to development and 
an insistence that aid is not given as a “gift” (Brant 2012, p.91).  
During the Cold War era, China endured ideological confrontation with the US over 
Taiwan in 1950s and Korea and also split with the Soviet Union in 1960s. Steven 
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Goldstein has attributed the reason to Mao Zedong’s assumption about “the piousness 
of China to Soviet revisionism”, and China has the duty to defend the Marxist faith 
against international anti-socialist forces including revisionist (1994, p.247). Therefore, 
Mao’s “self-reliance” policy illustrates an idea that one nation-state is not subjected to 
the influence of foreign countries particularly referring to the Soviet. David Kerr (2007, 
p.80) also provides us with a detailed analysis:  
 
The repercussions of the breach with Moscow, occasioned in part by 
disagreement over the nature of socialist development, reverberated 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The withdrawal of Soviet aid and 
guidance in 1960 contributed to the economic crisis of 1960–1961; the 
loss of China’s major trade partner forced it to look to domestic resources; 
and the deterioration in the country’s security environment led to a major 
re-assessment of the military industrial strategy.  
 
As a result, the abrupt cancellation of aid from the Soviet drove then Chinese leadership 
the negative image of dependence on aid and refused aid from foreign countries in the 
next 20 years (Kobayashi 2008, p.6). The sense of insecurity produced by the victim 
identity requires China should take the initiative role in development with its own hands. 
Furthermore, the notion of self-development shares the same meaning that one country 
has every single right to determine its own development path, and aid is not free gifts 
for recipient countries merely dependent on aid or support. Thus,the significance to 
self-reliance and self-development has been stressed by government officials. For 
instance, Chinese president Xi Jinping(2013), at an official visit to Tanzania in 2013 
expressed this principle, stating:  
 
There is no one-size-fits-all development model in the world. The diversity of world 
civilizations and development models should be respected by all. China will 
continue to firmly support African countries in exploring development paths that 
suit their own national conditions and increase exchanges of governance 
experience with African countries. (Emphasis added) 
 
Yet, the principle of self-reliance and self-development is not value free. In practice, 
infrastructure-related aid projects serve as the means to fulfillthe realization of 
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industrialization and modernization.To be specific, Chinese way of self-development is 
stressing the importance of stimulating economic growth as the means to achieve 
industrialization and modernization. However, in rhetoric, China is encouraging aid 
recipients to achieve the goal of modernization based on its own conditions and 
requirements.  
 
2.2.2. Non-interference and No Political Conditions  
Non-interference in internal affairs of another country is the cornerstone of China’s 
foreign policy, and also serves as an extension of Chinese foreign aid. The idea of 
non-interference derives from the classic Westphalian concept, stating that states 
should not interfere in the internal affairs of other sovereign states (Yeh 2010, 
p.67).Thus, a Westphalian system is said to rest upon sovereignty of political unit, 
territorial sovereignty, and non-intervention.  
 
China has held a statist view of classic Westphalian concept emphasis on the central 
importance of state authority in notion of sovereignty. Its adherence to strict 
Westphalian norms of state sovereignty is also shaped by China’s victimhood identity. 
Furthermore, the domestic sovereignty norm becomes rooted in the experience in 
leading up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s successful defeat of the Kuo Min 
Tang (KMT) in the civil war. As Yeh explains (2010, p.55), in keeping with its adherence 
to the sovereignty norm, China should not support, either direct or indirect, 
interference in the affairs of other sovereign states, and should resist such external 
interference.  
 
The promotion of Non-interference norm since Zhou Enlai articulated the “Five 
Principles” as the corner stone of Chinese foreign policy in 1954. In practice, there is an 
increasing inconsistence. The often cited example contributed to justify the sovereignty 
norm did not affect China’s behaviors in 1950s and 1960s (Yeh2010, p.56 Brant 2012 
pp.93-94, at the time when class struggles and ideological fever embedded with 
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Marxism and Leninist were dominant regardless of the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty. Mao distributed aid to recipient countries in Southeast and Arica in support 
of specific insurrection and liberation movements, and therefore interfered with 
countries domestic sovereignty. Zhang Yongjin (2008, p.102) echoes this view arguing 
that “China’s understanding and practices of sovereignty statehood have been 
incomplete, selective, instrumental or even contradictory”.  
 
The non-interference of recipient countries’ internal affairs shows respect for their 
development paths, and therefore attaches no strings to aid provision. As a matter of 
fact, the principle of attaching no strings makes a distinction between China and 
traditional donors. Noticeably, imposing no political conditions on recipient countries 
are emphasized rather than conditionality per se. Zhang Haibing(2009,p.93) has noted 
the changes in the language of “non-conditionality” range from different historical 
contexts. According to Zhang, it was first mentioned by Zhou Enlai in the Eight Principle 
as “not attaching any conditions”. The first shift occurred in 1980s while then premier 
Zhao Ziyang added the word “political” stressing “not attaching any political conditions” 
in China’s foreign aid policy. The second change occurred in 2005 removed the qualifier 
“any” as “not attaching political conditions”. Zhao commented non-political 
conditionality as “a highly robust and flexible policy”. However, the adjustment of the 
policy has been made in company with the changing domestic and international factors. 
Brant (2012, p.96) has commented the “subtle yet significant” changes demonstrate 
China’s capability to “modify the norm in response to changing domestic and 
international imperatives”.  
 
Generally speaking, China is careful not to interfere in recipients’ internal affairs, and 
show respects for their own development paths which are suitable for their own 
national conditions (He 2012, p.147). However, for a long time, the acceptance of the 
one-China policy is the only condition attached to Chinese foreign aid. Be specifically, 
the Taiwan issue occupies a special place in this variant of Chinese national identity: 
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indeed, as long as China remains divided, it will not be able to completely overcome its 
victim mentality and reclaim its international status. Thus, the PRC deems the Taiwan 
issue to be an integral part of Chinese nation building, involving matters of territorial 
integrity and national unity. And, any attempts by the government in Beijing to seek a 
compromise with Taipei over the sovereignty issue, i.e. by accepting Taiwan as an 
independent nation-state, would likely result in a public backlash in the PRC and hence 
threaten the CCP regime. In this sense, one-China policy serves as an underpinned 
precondition in Chinese foreign aid policy. As we can see in the next chapter, switching 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing in the South Pacific region is the strings attach to gain 
aid from PRC.  
 
2.2.3 Mutual Benefit and Equality  
The principle has been interchangeably used with “win-win” rhetoric in official remarks 
and documents (Reilly 2012, p.76). It suggests both the recipient countries and China 
would be beneficial through economic engagement or individual projects. However, the 
relationships between China and recipients are not necessarily equal. Brant (2011, 
p.1)argues that it is conceptualized with the belief that recipients’ development 
contributes to China’s development vice-versa. Moreover, the principle serves China’s 
domestic imperatives such as providing contracts for Chinese companies working on the 
government financed-aid projects. In this sense, the norm of mutual benefit does not 
convey strong domestic moral imperative for aid giving, nor is it immersed in a colonial, 
imperial, civilizing mission.  
 
In relations to identities, the norm of equality and mutual benefit is being stressed in 
Mao’s era towards countries with similar ideology or same colonial experiences, 
particularly those newly independent African countries and the non-aligned world 
(Brautigam 2009, p.32), which somewhat share the experience of being victims of 
imperialists. Then, against the background of economy opening up, the norm is closed 
linked with developing countries identity, which enables China to develop 
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agrowth-based approach to foreign aid, and later cultivates a sophisticated market 
oriented-aid mechanism. In particular, the experience of being the largest recipient of 
bilateral aid from Japan since early 1980s has to some extent reproduced Chinese 
perception on mutual benefit into a more economic sense (Lancaster2009, p.39). When 
Deng Xiaoping came to power in late 1970s, China’s economy devastated after years of 
ideological campaigns, whereas Japan had already ranked the second place in world 
economy. At that time, China is inspired by Japan which has been recovered from 
devastation after the Second World War to an economic super power in twenty to thirty 
years. Chinese scholar Feng (2008, p.6) explains that when Deng visited Japan in 1978 he 
expressed China’s willingness to learn advanced techniques from Japan. As Katada 
argues(2009,p.56), China’s perception on mutual benefit and economic cooperation is 
primarily due to the fact that a large amount of Japanese foreign aid was provided in the 
form of loans instead of grants while other bilateral donors such as the members of EU 
tend to provide grants. In addition, Chinese perception of how relations between two 
countries at different levels of development might be beneficial to both has been 
shaped on early interaction with Japan (Brautigam 2009, pp.47-48). As a specialist on 
Japan’s aid, David Arase (1995, p.40) argues that:  
 
The novel aspect of this so-called Goa formula in economic cooperation 
was that in exchange for assured access to important raw materials, Japan 
would provide the necessary equipment, technical training, and financing.  
As a result, China has learned that economic cooperation would help the country earn 
foreign exchange. To be specific, Japan is abundant in capital and technology which is 
desired by China for the realization of industrialization. Meanwhile, China’s rich in raw 
materials and in cheap labor is needed for Japan’s economic growth.  
 
Thus, the principles and norms make China differentiate from traditional donors. 
Lancaster (2007, p.5) insightfully reminds us China is seeking to differentiate it from the 
Western donors. She explains that:  
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[PRC] clearly do not want to be identified as just one more member of the rich 
countries’ aid clubs. For political reasons they want to project their own distinctive 
image in Asia, Africa and Latin America—one of South-South cooperation, of a 
special understanding and sympathy that comes from sharing problems of poverty; 
one of having emerged rapidly (but not yet completely) from those problems; and 
one that will provide them with a separate and privileged relationship with the 
governments they are helping and cultivating.  
 
In addition to the continuation of the traditional principles, the responsible power 
identity also requires China to adhere to international aid norms. It is interesting to see 
China has slowly transformed to respond to the international community hoping to 
demonstrate the willingness to be responsible. The slight shift can be seen from China’s 
response to establish doors in Paris in 2005, when donors and aid recipients came 
together organized by OECD, signing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which 
promised a new system of mutual accountability based on ownership, alignment, 
transparency, harmonization, and results. The Chinese sent a delegation to the Paris 
meeting but signed by pledge by claiming itself as a recipient of aid not a donor 
(Brautigm 2009, p.133). The transformation goes on develop.During 2011 Busan 
conference on aid effectiveness the conference, China was refused to be taken as a 
donor during the presence and participation in.  
 
However, Bergamaschi (2011, p.3) observes that the Chinese delegates speak about aid 
which they have been reluctant to do for decades, thus, slowly embracing bits of the 
existing international language. It showed that socialization and interactions play a role. 
Another example shows in the published 2011 official foreign aid White Paper.It states 
that the foreign aid objective is to “help recipient countries to strengthen their 
self-development capacity…and within the context of part of fulfilling its international 
responsibilities” (White Paper 2011).In a sense, it demonstrates Chinese self-claimed 
perception as a developing country and that its willingness to take the responsibility in 
international development community. Nevertheless, it also reflects a paradox position 
China has in terms of foreign aid provision and a compromise it has made for domestic 
front and international community. 
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2.3 The Institutionalization of Aid Norms and Types  
2.3.1 Operational Structure  
A strong mercantilism belief in company with the establishment of a sophisticated 
market mechanism has made a decentralized Chinese aid system where the 
economic-oriented aid institutions is in turn a reflection of a strong belief of economic 
growth serving as both the means and ends of aid.  
 
The State Council guides the policy direction,the Ministry of Commerce is the major 
executive body of managing foreign aid, and the Ministry of Finance approves the 
budget and is in charge of multilateral aid. In addition, the role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is complementary to the Ministry of Commerce and Finance. As Brautigam 
explains(2011,pp.110-111), the former drafts the annual plan for aid together with the 
Ministry of Commerce, and also signs off on any changes in the aid plan, and decision on 
cash aid, along with the latter. The pundit’s analysis demonstrates that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has come clout but not influential. Brant (2012, p.122) also reminds us 
those other ministries (particularly Health, Education, Agriculture, Science and 
Technology) run their own programs. Along with ministries, two large policy 
banks-China Development Bank (CDB) and China Eximbank- are responsible for the bulk 
of China’s overseas financing, according to Brant (p.122Eximbankis in charge of 
managing concession loans which derives from the Chinese government’s foreign aid 
budget. And, China Development Bank does not provide foreign aid, but it offers 
non-concession and development finance to other levels of the Chinese government, or 
state-owned companies (Brautigam 2011, p.115).  
 
Furthermore, Chinese overseas Embassies and Chinese companies are involved in 
implementing the government-financed aid programs to recipients. To be specific, 
Embassies play a significant role in China’s aid program’s implementation. According to 
Brant (2012, p.123), the aid program is overseen by staff from the Economic and 
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Commercial Counsel’s office within the Chinese embassy, and they are not development 
experts. Brant(2012,p.123) also reminds us that Chinese companies which are basically 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) are important actors in China’s foreign aid program. And 
they are serving as Chinese contractors to implement China aid projects in recipients’ 
communities in the fields like construction, transportation, heavy industries, 
etc(Fang&Lien 2012,p.8). 
 
Chart 1, the Organizational Structure of Chinese Aid System 
 
(Source: illustrated by Brautigam (2010, p. 108), and modified by the author)  
 
In addition, Carol Lancaster (2007, p.5) points out that there is not an independent unit 
in any prominent think thank conducting the research with regards to Chinese 
international development. However, there are few entities specialized in Chinese 
foreign aid delivery and international development, for instance, Department of 
Development aid under Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation which is affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce. However, the entities 
itself is not as influential as other prominent think tanks in China, and also it is lack of 
accessibility and transparent to the outside.  
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2.3.2 Types of Chinese Foreign Aid  
The commercial nature of Chineseforeign aid is also reflected in types of Chinese foreign 
aid. It has seen a shift from a grants-oriented aid to an interests-based aid. Brant 
(2012,p.104)reminds us that grants and interest-free loans are the main types of 
Chinese foreign aid until concessional loans are introduced and implemented by China 
Eximbank in 1995.  
 
According to the research conducted by Stellenbosch Chinese Centre (2008, p.1), there 
are basically three types of delivery with regards to China’s bilateral grant aid, interest 
free loans, and concessional loans. And, the White Paper provides data seems to echo 
Stellenbosch’s findings that up to the end of 2009, grants took the proportion of 
41 %( 106.2billion RMB), 30% interest free loans (76.54 billion Yuan), and 29% in 
concessional loans (73.55 billion) (the White Paper 2011). However, Stellenbosch 
studies suggests that the ration of grants to loans range from 1:100 to 50:50 is various 
from recipient to recipient (2008, p.11).  
 
2.4.2.1 Grant aid& Technical assistance  
Grants usually are not given as cash, but rather delivered in the formats of Chinese 
goods and services (Brautigam 2011, p.125). Grants are used for small-medium projects 
for social welfare, and other in–kind assistance. The official White Paper categorizes 
building hospitals, schools and low-cost houses, and water-supply projects as the 
fulfillment of social welfare (2011, p.7). Furthermore, other in-kind assistance is consist 
of providing expertise in the fields of education, health, agriculture, environmental 
conservation, military and processing(Stellenbosch 2008,p.11). In addition, it links to 
offer scholarships for studying Chinese, and training programs for recipients (eg, Fiji 
public servants went to China Executive Leadership Academy, Pudong). Apart from 
providing goods and services, Brautigam(2011,p.124) reminds us that chinese 
government’s humanitarian aid as a rapid response to emergencies or disasters is 
provided by cash usually reported in US dollars, in keeping with a growing trend among 
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other donors.  
 
2.4.2.2 Interest-free loans  
Interest free loans are usually for 20 years, including five years of use, five years’grace 
and ten years of repayment are utilized for public facilities and projects that “improve 
people’s livelihoods”(the White Paper 2010,p.8).However, interest free loans are only 
provided according to China’s assessment of the recipients with relatively good financial 
conditions. According to Stellenbosch’s study on Chinese aid to Africa (2008, p.13), the 
interest free loans would be cancelled and changed to debt relief in Africa (in effect 
convert into grants) on the occasions for high official visits. In a sense, it could interprets 
China aspires to gain respect from both recipient countries and the international 
community as a responsible power.  
 
2.4.2.3 Concessional loans  
Concessional loans are provided to fund large projects, with a minimum loan of 20 
million RMB and a current annual interest rate of between 2-3%, with 15-20 year 
repayment terms after an initial 5-7 year grace period (the White Paper 2011, p.8). 
These loans are utilized for joint-ventures or cooperation projects, which are designed 
for generating both economic and social profits (Brant 2012, p.105). Unlike the interest 
free loans, concessional loans are at least write-off or rescheduled (Stellenbosch 2008, 
p.12). China Eximbank is in charge of raising the concessional loans, as Brant explains 
(2012, p.105), “to the government of the borrowing country with the nature of official 
assistance”. The purpose of these loans is to “promote economic development and 
improve living standards in developing countries”, and to “boost economic cooperation 
between developing countries and China”, as Brant explains (2012, p.105).Interestingly, 
the eligibility of borrowing countries shall have sound diplomatic relations with the 
Chinese government, and shall be economically sound, with debt servicing capacity and 
reliable contract-performance record(Eximbank website, translate from Chinese to 
English, accessed on 3 Dec 2013).Brant (2012,p.105)reminds us that the range of 
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financial mechanisms are integral to Chinese aid for formulating economic and 
development agreements with other developing countries. The analyst (2012, p.105) 
alsocompares those financial mechanisms (official loans at commercial rates, exports 
credits, supplier’s credits) with DAC definitions-would be classified as other official flows 
(OOF). 
 
2.3.4 Aid Modalities  
Regarding the forms of aid, the White Paper classifies eight forms: complete projects; 
goods and materials; technical cooperation; human resource development cooperation; 
medical teams sent abroad; emergency humanitarian aid; and volunteer programs in 
foreign countries; and debt relief (2011, p.9).  
 
Generally speaking, the general impression is that the forms of Chinese foreign aid as 
“strong focus on hardware projects-physical infrastructure construction rather than 
software projects-research and capacity-building, as He (2012, p.152) comments. In 
details, the existing literature written by Chinese scholar and English speaking 
researcher highlights different part of aid forms. Brant highlights the distinctive features 
of the forms of aid to demonstrate the uniqueness of Chinese aid as potential evidence 
to justify the model with “Chinese characteristics” (2012, p.109). The analyst basically 
analyzes four categories in details. The first one comes from the form of “complete 
projects” known as “turn-key projects”. For Chinese government, it is beneficial due to it 
is efficient and results-oriented. However, those kinds of projects are relying on Chinese 
contractors and laborers and therefore arouse concerns from other donors and 
recipients (Brant 2012, p.110). The second distinctive feature of China’s aid program 
originates from Chinese Medical Team. Brant (2012,pp.110-111)explains that China is in 
charge of sending Chinese doctors overseas, providing medical facilities, medication. 
However, it is worthwhile to notice that whether Chinese foreign aid covers more areas 
such as epidemic, AIDS/HIV diseases and environmental protection.  
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Furthermore, Brant (2012, p.111) reminds of us that technical assistance is an important 
aid modality for traditional donors. The technical cooperation and human resources fit 
into this mode.Technical Cooperation is an important means to enhance 
recipients’development capacity. Human Resource Development Cooperation 
compasses training for government officials and other professional personnel from 
recipient countries. According to the White Paper (2011, p.14), those programs began to 
run in China. The sector includes the field of economy, diplomacy, agriculture, medical 
and health care, and environmental protection, etc. In addition to the previous four 
categories, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and 
debt relief are relatively newly-developed forms. It could be understood in the context 
of the rise of China, and also part of the evidence to be a responsible power. China 
gradually plays a proactive role in humanitarian aid. With the rapidly growing economy, 
China has begun to promote Chinese language, culture and diplomacy all over the world. 
According to the White Paper, China began to send volunteers mainly in the field of 
Chinese language teaching, medical and health care from 2002 onwards.  
 
By examining Chinese aid types and modality, it has demonstrated a slightly trends for 
China’s adherence to international norms. As Brant argues (2012, p.89), Chinese foreign 
aid delivery is used in both rhetoric and practice to support the construction of the 
image of being a responsible power. So, to what extent China is engaged with Western 
donors and at the same time demonstrates its willingness to be responsible? 
Geographically speaking, China has expanded its engagement with others part of the 
world by holding forums framed aid within a broad set of economic cooperation policies. 
For instance, it sees the China-Pacific Islands Economic Development Forum was set up 
in 2006 against the backdrop of the rise of China and held the second one in 2013. I shall 
testify the changes and continuations through analyzing China’s foreign aid in the South 
Pacific region in the next chapter.
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Chapter III China’s Bilateral Aid to the South Pacific: Cases Studies 
of Fiji and the Cook Islands 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Not long before in April 11th 2013, the Second China-Pacific Forum was hold in Guang 
Zhou city in Chinawhere the Chinese government announced $1billion US dollars in 
loans and other forms of aid. It is also interesting to notice that climate change has 
addressed in Vice Premier Wang Yang’s remarks. In comparison to the first Pacific 
Forum which was hold in 2006, both the quality and quantity of China’s aid has been 
increasing. In a sense, it demonstrates that China is dedicated to maintain a longer-term 
relationship with the region.  
 
This chapter is aiming at exploring the changes and continuations of Chinese foreign aid 
pattern. To be specific, China’s status as a developing country keeps limiting the cost of 
financed-aid projects regardless of the impact and sustainability. Paradoxically, serving 
as a responsible power means that the donor country should stress concerns and 
demands of recipient countries, and adhere to international aid norms. Accordingly, it is 
plausible to put it into a broader context of a rising China and further integration into 
the international community.  
 
3.2. The Rise of China and its Engagement with the South Pacific  
The acceleratedwealth and influence enable China to translate into influence-to be 
respected by other countries. It provides China’s opportunity to engage with the 
international community to avoid encirclement or isolations. Thus, China’s engagement 
with the South Pacific is better understood against the backdrop of a rising China and its 
interaction with the international community.  
 
Wesley-Smith(2013,p.358) reminds us that China has expanded its engagement with 
developing countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia by “a plethora of 
recent investments and trade agreements, construction projects, and multilateral 
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initiatives”. Apart from bilateral relations, China has taken initiatives to engage those 
regions under differentmultilateral frameworks. China firstly established “the Forum on 
China and Africa Cooperation” (FOCACC) in 2000. Ian Taylor (China and Africa forum 
2011, p.1) commented it as “the institutionalization of Sino-African relations at a time of 
intensified interactions and following a period of exponential growth in such linkages”. 
Furthermore, China has initiated a similar multilateral mechanism with Arabic countries 
called China-Arab states Cooperation Forum in 2004. The South Pacific is no exception. 
China established China-Pacific Islands Form in 2006 in Fiji, and after seven years, the 
second one was hold in Guang Zhou, China in 2013. What is important in recognizing the 
impact of this forum is that the growing economic imperatives underpinning China and 
the South Pacific linkages.  
 
3.3. Norms and Aid Practice  
3.3.1 One-China Policy  
As I have analyzed in previous chapter, the One-China policy could be understood 
embedded with thenon-interference aid norms as Taiwan has been regarded as an 
integral part of PRC. Thus, competitions with Republic of China (ROC) for diplomatic 
recognitions are considered as a significant driving force for China in the Pacific. 
However, this variable has gradually become less noteworthy. In fact, both sides have 
made great efforts in enhancing existing relations.  
 
Taiwan has long been regarded as an integral part of PRC. As Brady and Henderson 
explain (2010, p.193), the One-China policy means that other countries must only 
recognize the PRC as a judicial and legitimate sovereignty state, and therefore should 
exclude Taiwan as the prerequisite for diplomatic recognitions and aid delivery. The 
improved Cross-Strait relations are likely to lessen tensions and competitions between 
Taipei and Beijing in the South Pacific region.For instance, Taiwanese President Ma 
Ying-jeous proposed a diplomatic truce in 2008. As Marc Lanteigne(2013, p.2) explains, 
this truce signified that neither side would seek to entice one of the other’s diplomatic 
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partners to switch diplomatic recognition. The scholar also reminds us that with Ma’s 
re-election as president in 2012 the diplomatic ceasefire remain in place. Another 
analyst, Philippa Brant echoes this statement. In her recent opinion piece, Brant (2013, 
p.1) argues that the political rivalry between China and Taiwan “gives way to new 
maturity”. That is to say, checkbook diplomacy is unlikely to racketing up, simply 
because neither China nor Taiwan (nor Pacific Island countries) wants to return to the 
days of wasteful white elephant aid projects.
 
In practice, China has provided aid only to those recipient countriesthatrecognize China 
as the prerequisite, and expanded its aid relations toward a broader economic and trade 
cooperation. I will return this point while analyzing China economic cooperation with 
the South Pacific region. However, it is also necessary to manage a potential switch from 
China to Taiwan. Brant (2013, p.2) provides an example to illustrate that the domestic 
politics of recipients could also be another variable test political truce between the two 
entities. For instance, in 2011, Vanuatu threatened to open a trade office in Taiwan in 
an attempt to force China to provide funds to meet its US$32 million budget shortfall. 
As a result, notably annoyed Chinese ambassador agreed to provide 'part of' the funds 
on the condition that Vanuatu upheld the One-China policy and didn't make moves 
towards Taiwan (Lowy Institute 2013).  
 
3.3.2. Mutual Benefit and Equality  
Series of research reports released by Sydney-based Lowy Institute (Hanson &Fifita 2011, 
Hayward-Jones 2013a, 2013b) hold the view that what drives China is largely due to 
supporting its commercial interests and pursing South-South cooperation in the region 
through analyzing China’s aid activities and programs. However, I would argue that 
China’s developing country and responsible rising power identitiesenable its further 
engagement with the South Pacific region. Furthermore, Chinese aid programs is a 
reflection of mutual benefit and equality principle. Making comparison with two 
officialstatements and addresses helps demonstrate China’s commercial engagement 
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with the Pacific Island countries. Chinese aid delivery in the form of “packages” is 
announced by high level officials in Chinese-sponsored regional forums. In April 2006 
then Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao announced $492 million US dollars(RMB 3 billion 
Yuan) of preferential-loans from 2007-2009 in the first China-Pacific Islands Forum. It 
aims to “enhance cooperation in resources development, agriculture, forestry, fishery, 
tourism…” (Official speech 2006).Quite similar, not long time ago, Chinese vice Premier 
Wang Yang announced up to $1 billion US dollars in concessional financeover four years 
in the second China-PFI forum (official speech 2013). Nevertheless, Chinese foreign aid 
in general is phrased under the framework of the “South-South” cooperation 
demonstrating a sense of equality (a framework for collaboration among developing 
countries in various fields, and is meant to take the form of partnership where 
knowledge and skills are shared to promote development). As Ron Crocombe (2007, 
p.218) correctly identified, China’s aid moved to a new level in 2006 and China widened 
the range to a pattern more similar toother major established donors by increasing the 
assistance to the fields of agriculture, education, forestry, fishing, tourism, 
manufacturing, telecommunications, aviation, shipping and health.  
 
However, such altruistic explanations should not always be accepted at face value. In 
practices, the mutual benefits and equalitynorms seem not consistent with the rhetoric. 
Chinese governmental aid includes a combination of “aid” and “non-aid” measures. 
Commentators (devpolicy.org2013) observe that both addresses saw a substantial 
commitment to concessional loans for infrastructure development. Thus, there is an 
increasingly concern about recipients’ debts capability such as Tonga and Samoa. For 
these countries, there is unlikely to be any benefits from the new loans announced by 
China. Whether the full amount of $1 billion is actually lent by China is also uncertain, 
given limited absorptive capacity in the region.  
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Chart2: Comparison Official Statements Highlighted in Two Forums  
 
Contents  1st Forum 2006  2nd Forum 2013  
Trade  Chinese investments  Zero-tariff treatment  
Concessional 
loans  
 
$492 million US dollars (RMB 3 
billion RMB)  
Cancel debts  
 
$1 billion US dollars  
Education  Training officials   
Scholarships  
Training  
Building up more schools  
Marian teaching  
 
Tourism  Enhancing tourism with seven 
countries with diplomatic 
relations  
Negotiating bilateral civil aviation 
agreements and bilateral direct 
flight  
 
Medicine  Medical assistance  
Epidemic prevention  
 
Medical assistance  
Epidemic prevention  
 
Agriculture   Agricultural trade and investment 
through agricultural demonstration 
farms  
Environment Helping managing earthquakes, 
tsunamis and other natural 
disasters in Pacific countries  
 Energy-efficient 
home appliances  
Ocean environment monitoring 
system  
 
(Sources: Chinese government Document 2006; Devpolicy.org 2013) 
 
3.3.3 The limitation of Geopolitical Analysis  
A geopolitical interests-based analysis is not convincing to drive China’s engagement 
with the South Pacific countries, given that South Pacific’s limited influence in Chinese 
security strategy.Therefore, China’s engagement with the South Pacific should be 
examined in the context of the rise of China and its engagement with other developing 
countries driving by commercial and status concerns. YongJin Zhang(2010,p.50) and 
Terence Wesley-Smith(2010,p.29) point out that China’s engagement should be viewed 
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in a broader context of China’s active diplomatic relations with other developing regions, 
namely, Africa, Latin America and southeast Asia.  
 
However, the academic debates regarding China’s geo-political concerns become more 
nuanced, for instance, Marc Lanteigne(2013,p.27) claims that a prompt Sino-US power 
dynamic is moving to a balance ofhard power due to China’s military modernization and 
American responses to its traditional defensive role in East Asia, thus having a “spillover 
effect” on South Pacific nations. Yet, the empirical evidence have demonstrated that 
China is expanding its naval and maritime capabilities, holding a hardline 
attitudetowards territorial disputes in both South China Sea and East China Sea. At the 
same time,the United States is carrying out “pivot to the Asia Pacific” strategy under 
Obama administration. This interpretation is justified by a congressional research paper 
in which it demonstrates the worries about China’s increasing military capabilities 
become a primary focus of U.S. militaryin spite of the fact that China is not the only 
potential source of challenges (American Congress analysis 2012, p.16). 
 
However, the analysis starts from a realist premise of balance of power viewing it is a 
zero-sum game of inter-states relations. As American Ambassador to China, Gary Locke 
(Beijing US Embassy 2013) remarked: 
 
Today the U.S.-China relationship has emerged as one of the most 
important bilateral relationships in the world, and so our two countries 
are attempting to develop a new model of relations whereby we are both 
committed to avoiding the historic trap of strategic rivalry between an 
emerging power and an existing power. 
 
Furthermore, this analysis regards military capability as the driving forces for foreign 
policy making putting other determinants like economic development, domestic politics 
aside. Lanteigne (2013,p.21) also argues that the South Pacific is an integral part of 
China’s assertive strategic plan to soft balancing traditional players such as the U.S. and 
its extensions of Australia and New Zealand. Thus, Chinese bilateral aid in the South 
Pacific serves as means to fulfill the overall strategic interests, which are defined as a 
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soft-balancing behavior, simply because Chinese aid is different from traditional donors.  
 
Analysts hold the view that China’s strategic engagement is limited in this region. In the 
upfront, Jian Yang (2011, p.132) argues that the South Pacific’s values towards China’s 
national security strategy should not be exaggerated, and would not likely to challenge 
existing dominant powers in this region. And, Fergus Hanson (2010, pp.91-92) echoes 
Yang’s view providing more empirical evidence. Hanson observes that yet some of 
China’s aid is directed towards regional defense and paramilitary forces(in Fiji, PNG, 
Tonga and Vanuatu), but it tends to be confined to benign intentions such as upgrading 
a military hospital in PNG or the supports of uniforms and cars for the Vanuatu Mobile 
Force. Furthermore, China’s increased engagement with the South Pacific region is not 
challenging the traditional donors’ (America, Australia, and New Zealand) development 
objectives given that the region is highly dependent on development aid. One the one 
hand, China’s aid in terms of quantity is very modest given that the largest donor in this 
region remains Australia. On the other hand, regarding to aid modality, Chinese aid 
ideas is different from western donors, no strings attached, non-interference principles 
are consistent with China bilateral aid in the past and present. In comparison, Australia 
has adopted a “whole-of-government” approach of aid to secure law and order, 
consolidate the state, strengthen justice systems and improve economic governance 
towards its neighbor countries (Schwebel2009, p.113).  
 
I have demonstrated that a geopolitical interest is not convincing to drive China’s 
engagement with the South Pacific countries, given that South Pacific’s significance to 
Chinese overall security strategy. Therefore, China’s aid delivery in the South Pacific 
should be examined in the context of the rise of China and its engagement with 
developing countries driving by China’s identities.  
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3.4 Chinese Bilateral Aid Programs: Case studies of Fiji and the Cook Islands  
The study has selected two representative cases-Fiji and Cook Islands. For the former, 
Fiji makes itself an interesting case to examine the nature and patterns of Chinese 
bilateral aid projects with good reasons. To be specific, it is regarded as a “pivotal state” 
in the region a regional hub and a relatively influential player in regional politics, and 
thus possibly best serving China’s political, strategic and economic interests (Tarte 2010, 
p.118). Furthermore, Fiji also provides a good opportunity to test China’s relations with 
traditional donors in the region. For instance, when traditional donors have sanctioned 
development aid to Fiji due to the military coup, Chinese aid is welcome by Fiji simply 
because of “no strings attached”but has aroused worries by both Australia and New 
Zealand. With regards to Cook Islands, it provides an opportunity to evaluate the impact 
of China’s bilateral aid projects and new developments, given that the size of the 
country and its intimated relations with a regional aid player-New Zealand.  
 
3.4.1 Chinese Bilateral Aid Programs to Fiji  
3.4.1.1. Grants  
Based on the research I have conducted, Chart4 below demonstrates Chinese aid 
programs sourcing from current academic research, and also news releases published by 
Fiji Chinese Embassy and Fijian media reports from 2008 to 2013. Grants in forms of 
tangible materials including infrastructure projects, vessels, office equipment, and 
vehicles are far more exceeding than checks giving to Fiji. It could be better understood 
that tangible materials better show the public that how much Chinese aid have given, 
and also help to earn enough respect from recipient. However, There is an increasingly 
tendency that grants-funded programs have diversified covering the area of education 
and training, infrastructure construction, technical hardware, particularly from 2010  
when the proportion of education and training sectors have been raising. According to 
Brant’s (2013, p.168) interview conducted in 2009 in Fiji with Chinese official stating that 
“they want to diversify their development”, and the aid programs have identified four 
main areas of focus: infrastructure and public services; production and technical 
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services; human resources and capacity enhancement; and funding to regional 
organizations (Chinese Embassy in Fiji has donated S6.5million for Pacific Island Forumin 
2010 and 2011 respectively). 
 
3.4.1.2 Concessional Loans  
The disbursement of China’s bilateral aid to Fiji should not be overestimated, despite of 
the absent official statistics on the total amount of grants and loans. Chart 4 
demonstrates that there have been three loan-financed projects, namely Fijian-E 
government information infrastructure project, the Fiji public Rental Housing Project for 
low-cost housing Plan and Dreketi-Nabouwalu Highway Project so far. According to 
Yang’s (2010, p.77)study on loan-financed projects, the Fijian government planned 
US$20 million and US$123million (FJ$260million) from Chinese Export-Import Bank of 
China for the first two project respectively. In practice, the E-government project has 
been completed in 2008. The other two projects are still on-going, and echo to Fiji 
official figures provided by Development Co-operation and Facilitation Division 
(affiliated with Fiji Prime Minsters Office).  
 
According to the Division (Concessional Loan Projects by the People’s Republic of China), 
the two on-progressing projects, namely the low-cost housing project and the 
Dreketi-Nabouwalu Highway project are initially funded by EXIM Bank FJ$70m and 
FJ$ 93m.However, the low-cost housing project has halted due to the real cost (which is 
now Fiji$20 million) is far exceeding than loans financed (which is disbursed FJ$9million) 
by the Chinese government. During the meeting with his Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang 
May 2013, Fiji Prime Minister Bainimarama acquires more financial support for “settle 
the balance or convert the total amount into a grant”(Fiji PM Remarks 2013,p.2). The 
three loans-financed projects from 2008 demonstrate that the loan-financed projects 
are quite modest, probably resulted from a considerably cautious about the economic 
conditions of Fiji, and also a result of comprises made between Fiji and Chinese 
government in terms of conditions and terms of loans(Concessional Loan Projects by the 
People’s Republic of China).  
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In comparison to other regional donors, the total disbursement of Chinese aid is far 
behind. China ranked fifth far behind Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and 
Japan. China has disbursed approximately US$850 million in bilateral aid to the eight 
Pacific Island countries with established diplomatic relations, according to a research 
conducted over 2006 to 2011 by the Lowy Institute’s Philippa Brant (Hayward Jones, 
2013a, p.11). China regards foreign aid as a catalyst for economic growth as means and 
goals for itself and recipient countries with the notion of “mutual benefit”. However, the 
self-interest nature to support China’s own economic development would become 
dominant by utilizing aid as part of a broader investment package, in particular the 
combination of commercial activities operated by Chinese state-owned enterprises and 
state involvement. Fergus Hanson (Hanson 2011, p.7) observes that China’s aid giving 
activities in Fiji demonstrates a clear trend of delivering aid through soft loans for 
infrastructure projects. This is consistent with what China has actually been doing to 
provide soft loans. However, this self-interests nature of aid is embedded with Chinese 
aid-activities. All infrastructure-related projects are contracted to China-based research 
institutions and companies, most of which are state-owned entities. 
 
In Fiji’s case, China Railway No.5 Group, China Railway No.1 Group, and Hunan 
Construction Engineering Group Corporation are implementing in aid-related projects. 
Furthermore, in commercial activities, Chinese companies could also win over in the end. 
China Eximbank funded Nadarivatu hydro dam as a commercial investment, as Brant 
investigated (2013, p.172), Chinese Embassy in Fiji helped the Chinese state-owned 
company (Sinohydo) for its application to the contract “to compete with Western 
companies in the international arena”. 
 
Meanwhile, China aid project is not only given to a Chinese state-owned enterprise, but 
“virtually the entire workforce and supplies are sourced from China” (Yang 2011, p.79). 
Thus, China’s aid often ends up supporting China’s own economic development through 
investment in projects that deliver contracts to Chinese companies and employment to 
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Chinese nationals. Analysts often point out that this is only a zero-sum game, because 
Pacific Islanders, who tend to be excluded from opportunities to work on infrastructure 
projects funded by Chinese grant aid, may not see these projects as partnerships 
(Hayward-Jones 2013, p.10). However, in Fiji’s case, all the infrastructure projects are 
requested by Fijian military government and also integrate into its economic 
development plan. In May 2007, Fiji military government under the Prime Minister’s 
Office established an entity-called the Development Cooperation Facilitation Division 
(DCFD)-to manage and facilitate donors’ assistance in which the management of 
Chinese government obsessional loans and direct grants are prioritized (DCFD 2012).  
 
Interestingly, there are new developments in Fiji’s case. It is most likely state enterprises 
rather than the state deliver development assistance. Thus, companies’ commercial 
interests shape Chinese heavy involvement in this field. Graeme Smith (2013, p.339) 
makes a compelling argument that it is “Chinese infrastructure companies in the Pacific 
Islands, not aid agencies in Beijing” that are responsible for driving aid. Furthermore, 
Chinese funded-aid infrastructure projects are also addressing recipient’s demand. With 
regard to contracted labors, there is a slightly change in recent Dreketi-Nabouwalu 
Highway projectIn Fiji’s case. It has contracted to China Railway No.1 Group which has 
recruited 1,000 Fijian local labors. At globally level, forty per cent of China’s global 
foreign aid expenditure is for construction projects in which China provides some or all 
of the financing, services, materials and labors, which are clearly commercial and deliver 
by a bottom-up rather than top-down approach, contradicting with the argument that 
China’s development assistance is centrally a geo-strategic plan. Additionally, other 
players within Chinese fragmented aid-system are involved in the form of providing 
goods and services, and the Chinese Embassy in Fiji usually deliver aid on behalf of 
donor-entities based on China.  
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Chart 3: China' Bilateral Aid Programs to Fiji from 2008 to current 
 
 
 
(Sources from news release published by Fiji Chinese Embassy (2008-2013))  
 
3.4.1.3 Military coups and China’s responses  
The mutual benefit and non-interference norms are regarded as appropriated behaviors 
embedded with China’s aid practices. In rhetoric, those two principles appear 
consistently in Chinese government official remarks. “Mutual benefit” was uttered in 
2012 when then Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai told journalists at 
the Pacific Islands Forum in Rarotonga stating that “both China and the Pacific Island 
countries belong to the ranks of developing countries. China’s assistance…is in the 
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framework of south-south cooperation…” (Hayward-Jones 2013, p.20). 
 
“No strings attached” has also constantly expressed in official remarks as then Chinese 
premier WenJiabao(2006) at the inaugural China-PIC Forum stated, “China stands ready 
to provide assistance without any political strings attached”. Indeed, in the year 
following the Fijian2006 coup whentraditional donors abandoned aid assistance to Fiji 
-New Zealand and Australia felt apart the diplomat relationships, Chinese aid pledges 
increased seven-fold and stepped in. According the statistics Hanson and Jones provided 
in their news article China’s help may harm Fiji (The Australian 2009) stating that China 
refused to comment on the domestic political affairs of Fiji.  On the one hand, it shows 
Fijian strategic move under the military government. As Tarte argues (2010, p.124), the 
deteriorated relations between Fiji and traditional partners, namely Australia and New 
Zealand, enabled the “Look North strategy” deployed. The coup leader Frank 
Bainimarama stated “the Look North move was not to replace Australia and New 
Zealand, but to compensate for what Fiji had lost” and he also expressed confidence 
that China would always be there to support Fiji (p.125). However, China’s relations with 
aboutare prioritized to given that economic relations between China and New Zealand 
have developed closely. Yang(2011,p.78) pointed out that China seems make an effort 
to be a “responsible player”, and Beijing is more cautious in dealing with military 
regimes that are in trouble with the west as China told the visiting New Zealand Prime 
minister John Key that China would play a constructive role in the resolution of the Fiji 
issue. Thus, when Fijian Prime Minister last year official visit to Beijing, he expressed his 
willingness for holding a general election in 2014.  
 
3.4.2 The Cook Islands  
By examining China’s bilateral aid programsin Fiji from 2008 onwards, China’s aid 
delivery has been focusing in the field of infrastructure projects, most of which are given 
to Chinese national companies by using Chinese materials and labors. For the tiny 
territory of the Cook Islands, it is another interesting empirical case to help justify the 
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impact of Chinese aid and to explore the possible development model best suitable for 
recipients.  
 
The Cook Islands has not yet fully independent but a territory in “free association” with 
New Zealand. Bertil Lintner(2010, p.21) reminds us that it has developed strong 
relations with China. The biggest and newest buildings in the capital (the court house 
and a police station) are built with Chinese financed-aid and by workers brought in from 
China. However, concerns from traditional donors and the local community regarding 
sustainability of China’s infrastructure projects, debt burdens and lack of flow-on 
benefits have been certainly raised (Hanson 2009, p.5). In the front, it is said that the 
infrastructure projects have significant ongoing maintenance costs which exceeds the 
financial ability of Cook Island government. Hanson(2008,p.17) provides a convincing 
example that China built a new police headquarters, instead of using a central 
air-conditioning system, China insisted on using spilt-unit air conditioners which cost 
$US 26,000 a year to run. Another significant concern for China’s bilateral aid in the 
Cook Islands is the irresponsible lending.  
 
The Cook Islands has its credit rating downgraded by Standard and Poor’s, according to 
Hanson’s analysis (2011, p.9), reportedly in part because of the loans provided by China 
for the South Pacific Mini Games. Hanson further explains by citing the Cook Islands 
responses to its debt burden. The Cook Islands Deputy Prime Minister Sir TereaiMaoate 
was interviewed by Australian ABC Radio whether the Cook Islands were able to pay the 
loans back, he said, “we hope New Zealand will be at our aid to assist us with this”. 
Furthermore, the borrowing is also dependent upon the desires and strategies of 
recipient government leaders. Brant (2013, p.170) reminds us that the Cook Islands has 
decided to put a Chinese loan “on hold” due to concerns about taking on more debt and 
also the willingness to engage with more locals. The loans were for US$37 million 
(around 17 per cent of its GDP) for road and water projects.  
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From donor’s perspective, the financial stability of recipients certainly requires the 
former‘s consideration, but it could also argue that China is lack of knowledge and 
enough scrutiny to take the financial suitability of the Cook Islands into consideration. In 
fact, Chinese officials also appear concerned about the impact of Chinese financed aid. 
Michael Powles (2010, p.78) argues that Chinese is expressing positive statements on 
aid cooperation with traditional donors in this region by citing the Chinese ambassador 
to New Zealand’s remarks: 
 
‘We [China] want to work together with New Zealand, with Australia, consistent 
with the pacific Plan. We are only good in a certain number of areas, like 
infrastructure, office buildings. Even in those areas we want to work with New 
Zealand. For example, the Cook Islands people are criticizing us. They say that the 
court building did not have the right architectural style. Okay, in that area, perhaps 
we can work on the brick and masonry, or sometimes our money is not enough 
and we can pool our money.’  
 
During her interview by Radio New Zealand (2013), Philippa Brant (Radio New Zealand) 
introduced the progress of a trilateral aid program between China, New Zealand and the 
Cook Islands. She argues that China is genuinely interested in both improving their 
image in the region, but also learning about how other donors give aid. Based on her 
recent field trip to Cook Islands, Brant explains to us that this is a unique model, a 
cooperative project, in the Cook Islands (project which will see the Chinese lay 26 
kilometers of pipes and New Zealanders install water treatment facilities).Brant( Radio 
New Zealand interview 2013) explains: 
 
[it] is there will be between 30 and 40 Chinese workers coming in. They're 
set to arrive in the next couple of months. And they will be contracted by 
the Chinese companies that will be implementing their part of the project. 
And this company has been involved in the islands for a number of years, 
so well-established. 
 
Brant highlights the Cook Islands government negotiations with the Chinese side leading 
Chinese workers size down from 70 to between 30 and 40. Thus, the new trends are 
54 
 
that China’s part is more concerned about the recipient-Cook Islands’ needs. Brant went 
on to comment: 
 
The Chinese Embassy in Wellington-which they wanted to make sure that 
any future projects that they're involved in have a positive outcome for 
the people of the Cook Islands.  
 
According to New Zealand Aid programme, China had offered the Cook Islands a NZ$32 
million concessional loan for the project years earlier. The Cook Islands proposed to 
involve New Zealand, as a means of improving project effectiveness. New Zealand, 
which also has a very positive relationship with China (it is the first developed country to 
have signed a free trade agreement with China), contributed NZ$15 million towards the 
cost of the project and the Cook Islands government also contributed (Hayward-Jones 
2013b, p.12). The project was signed off at the Pacific Islands Forum in 2012. According 
to Brant’s observation, the Cook Islands government took the big role in in managing 
the project implementation (Radio New Zealand 2013): 
 
‘You had a Chinese loan sitting there, and New Zealand was prepared to 
assist the Cook Islands government by providing some grant funding, 
which enabled the cooks to set up structures that could better manage 
the Chinese loans...’ 
 
3.4.3 Cairns Compact or South-South Cooperation  
China’s multi-faceted behaviors in the South Pacific are largely dependent on its dual 
identities. One the one hand, the developing country identity demonstrates that China 
would not consider itself as a donor country but limit to a development partner, despite 
of the fact that China has been providing aid for more than five decades. In the South 
Pacific, having constructed cooperative relations with New Zealand, China has signed 
MoU with Australian government early this April 2013. Despite of a slightly trend of 
China’s willingness to cope with regional traditional donors, China has been addressing 
its identities as a developing country, and thus China’s assistance to other developing 
countries is framed under South-South Cooperation. Then the Chinese vice Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai (New Zealand Herald 2012) told journalists at the Pacific 
Islands Forum in Rarotonga in 2012 that: 
 
We are here to work with the island countries to achieve sustainable 
development because both China and the Pacific Island countries belong 
to the ranks of developing countries. *…+ our policy approach and our 
practice are very different from those of the traditional donor countries. 
We are ready to exchange views, to compare respective practice and here 
possible and feasible; we’re open to work with them for the benefit to the 
recipient countries. We are here to be a good partner with the island 
countries; we are not here to compete with anybody.  
 
In the South Pacific region, China’s proactive engagement with traditional donors should 
not be exaggerated.It has declined to participate in the Cairns Compact on 
Strengthening Development Co-operation at the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum in Cairns, 
aregional mechanism akin to Paris Declaration by traditional donor 
countries.(Hayward-Jones 2013a, p.15). 
 
It demonstrates that China still regards itself as a development country which is still 
receiving aid from bilateral-multilateral donors. And, the general public back home 
would not agree that Chinese government prioritize large chunk of aid to recipients 
other than for domestic development. Thus, the donor-recipient relations are carefully 
managed under the framework of the South-South cooperation as a development 
partner other than a donor. Wang Yongqiu(The Australian 2009), the senior Chinese 
delegate in Cairns, explained China’s reluctance to participate in the Compact in a media 
interview:  
 
‘We have different approaches and practices from Western developed 
countries. We feel it is unnecessary to accept this multilateral 
co-ordination mechanism, but we need time to study it. China is open and 
transparent in providing aid.’ 
Furthermore, China’s own development experience with the notion of self-reliance 
caused by the anarchic international structure has shaped China’s understanding of 
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aid ,which is not a free gift but a means to fulfil self-sufficient. Therefore, concessional 
loans have been keeping provided dictating China’s further engagement with the region 
particularly in the areas of economic cooperation. In addition to the idea of 
“self-reliance” towards development, it has seen an economic and commercial 
motivation embedded with Chinese foreign aid, as the case of the South Pacific and 
these ideas have been institutionalized through not an independent aid agency but a 
fragmented aid delivery system in which the Ministry of Commerce and EXIM Bank play 
a large role.  
 
One the other hand, the rising responsible power identity demonstrates international 
community’s scrutiny and expectations of a rising power, and in turn China’s responses 
to a peaceful rise approach towards international system. This identity has yet been 
weak meaning that China is in the process of transformation. However, new trends of 
China’s aid behaviors in the South Pacific region need to be drawn attention. First, China 
has expressed proactive attitudes towards being cooperative with traditional donors 
and is thus gradually becoming mature in aid delivery. There is a slightly trend of China’s 
willingness to cooperate with regional traditional donors, the Cook Islands and New 
Zealand have proved that aid cooperation with China is possible. Meanwhile, China has 
signed a development Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding with Australia last 
year probably enabling the two countries to cooperate on aid in the field of public 
health and water resource management (Hayward-Jones 2013, p.16). 
 
Moreover, China is also learning from the traditional donor. As Hanson (2011, p.4) noted, 
AusAID hosted a training workshop for 17 mid-level officials from the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce to discuss Australian best-practice system and approach and potentially 
could develop into an annual event. Second, there are several signs to show that China 
is slightly shifting from a self-centered, interested based engagement to addressing 
demands of recipient countries.For example, the Cook Islands case as analyzed above 
shows that China is concerning about its regional image and also the sustainability of its 
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financed-projects. In addition, China has somewhat expanded its cooperation with Fiji to 
the areas of  climate change, marine resources conservation and of helping achieve 
MDGs goals according to Fijian Chinese Embassy new releases(2012), despite that the 
real intention still needs to be testified. In a sense, it could be related to China’s 
response to be a responsible power, slightly learning the rules and languages set up by 
traditional donors.  
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Chapter IV Conclusion 
 
This thesis therefore argues that China’s align with the international norms remains 
limited despite that it has adopted a more cooperative stance on aid practices. Indeed, 
it is a reflection of a paradoxical position China is posing. The victimhood identity 
originates from a traumatic engagement with the international system, and the 
developing country identity put emphasis on China’s concern on domestic development 
and also means it has not repaired relations between itself and Western powers. Thus, 
the two identities have produced distinctive characters of Chinese foreign aid making it 
differentiated from traditional doors who promote “effective state”, “goodgovernance” 
“rule of law”, and democratic “functioning” institution which do not sit well with China’s 
domestic situation (Brant 2010, p.28). In contrast to traditional donors’norms, Chinese 
aid norms and principles constitutes, namely, “self-reliance” and “self–development”, 
“non-interference” associated with “no political strings attached”, and “mutual benefit” 
which are regarded as appropriate behaviors of victimhood identity and a developing 
country identity as I have analyzed in previous chapters.  
 
As China has normalized its relations with the international community, particularly 
western powers, the victimhood identity has been in decline. Furthermore, the 
responsible rising power identity has the mutually constituted by both agent and 
structure. On the one hand, China aspires to obtain great power status as its rapid 
economic growth in recent two decades. However, the international system also has 
impact on the formation of China’s great power identity, pinning high hopes of China 
being responsible. However, in contrast to the strong identity of a developing country, a 
responsible rising power identity remains weak. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
the aid norms and practices are closely link to the strong developing country identity.  
 
Through further socialization and integration into international system, China’s weak 
identity of being a responsible power has contributed to new trends of Chinese foreign 
aid in the empirical case study of South Pacific region. The findings demonstrate that 
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China is more cooperative with traditional donors in terms of learning from their 
management mechanism, and that it inclines to put emphasis on recipients’ needs to 
improve aid effectiveness ranging from addressing environmental issues in the case of 
Fiji and the Cook Island, to employing local labors rather than hiring Chinese labors. The 
best example is provided by the trilateral cooperative program with the collaboration of 
China, New Zealand and the Cook Islands.  
 
However, China will not transform immediately to be a like-minded western donor. The 
findings demonstrate that the continuation of China’s developing country identity as in 
practice China is further expanding its relations with Pacific countries going beyond aid 
relations but deepening its trade, tourism and education relations with the region.
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